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THE CASE FOR THE LINE-ITEM VETO
ALAN J. DIXON*
Federal spending is out of control. The federal budget
has been balanced only once in the last 20 years.1 Deficits
have risen from under $5 billion in fiscal year 1963 to over
$195 billion in fiscal 1983.' Fiscal year 1984 was only mod-
estly better - a mere $185 billion" - and, unfortunately, it
does not signal any lasting trend towards lower deficits. Both
the President's Office of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office project deficits over the next
years higher than $200 billion. It took this country over 190
years to reach the current accumulated national debt of over
$1.4 trillion.5 The next trillion in debt, however, will accumu-
late in only seven years if there are no fundamental changes
in federal budgetmaking. e
Unfortunately Congress and the President are not deal-
ing effectively with the budget crisis. As the deficit projec-
tions indicate, the budget problems are not getting better,
but worse. President Reagan was elected in 1980 on a prom-
ise to balance the budget by 1984. Instead, this conservative
President has presided over the largest deficits in American
history, and his fiscal 1984 budget indicated that a balanced
budget would not be achieved in the foreseeable future. 7
The reasons Congress and the President have failed to
* U.S. Senator (D-Ill); Member Board of Governors, Thomas J.
White Center on Law & Government, University of Notre Dame.
1. In 1969, the budget surplus was $3.2 billion. EXEC. OFF. OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF, FY 1985, at 84
(1984) [hereinafter cited as BUDGET 1985]. Since 1969, deficits have aver-
aged $35 billion annually. Taking into account all federal outlays (includ-
ing those of off-budget entities). The average yearly deficit since fiscal year
1975 has been close to $60 billion. See also D. IPPOLITO, CONGRESSIONAL
SPENDING 27-28 (1981).
2. BUDGET 1985, id., at 84.
3. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, THE U.S. BUDGET IN BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 1986, 6 (1985).
4. CONG. BUDGET OFF., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ECONOMIC AND
BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE xviii, 47 (1984).
5. BUDGET 1985, supra note 1, at 68.
6. See Id. at 84.
7. EXEC. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES BUDGET IN
BRIEF FY 1984, at 84 (1983).
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
restrain the growth of federal spending and to reduce and
finally eliminate federal budget deficits are numerous and
complex. One main cause of the deficit problem, however, is
the lack of appropriate institutional arrangements to restrain
the growth of spending.
In order to build greater fiscal discipline into the federal
budgeting process, I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 26,8
proposing a constitutional amendment authorizing the Presi-
dent to disapprove or reduce individual items of spending in
appropriations bills, in other words, to provide the President
with item veto authority.
S. J. Res. 26 builds on the President's existing veto
power but differs in a very important way. While under the
present veto provision, vetoes of an entire bill can be overrid-
den only by a two-thirds vote of both the Senate and the
House of Representatives, 9 the veto of an individual item of
appropriation could be overridden by a majority vote of each
House. 10
Because of the majority override provision, this constitu-
tional amendment differs from most of the proposals that
have preceded it." It is designed to strike a balance between
the need to provide additional control over spending and to
restore the effectiveness of the President's veto power, on the
one hand, with the need to preserve the balance of powers
and the role of Congress in the legislative process on the
other. While an item-veto may first appear to be a major de-
parture from current legislative practice in the budgetary
area, the proposal attempts to build on the roles the Consti-
tution has assigned the President and the Congress, and to
take into account existing budgetary realities.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution declares
8. S.J. Res: No. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S836(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983).
9. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-
tives and the senate shall, before it became a law, be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States; If he approves he should sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall ... proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsid-
eration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall be-
come a law." U.S. CONST., art. I, §7, cl. 2.
10. S.J. Res. 26, supra, at 837-38.
11. See Proposals to Grant the President the Power to Item Veto
Appropriations Bills, Library of Congress, American Law Division, (Oct.
23, 1981).
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that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law. . . ." Other
constitutional provisions give Congress the power to tax,12 to
borrow money,"3 and to spend. 4 Under the Constitution,
therefore, Congress plays the preeminent role in the spend-
ing process.
During the early years of the Republic, Congress seemed
to exercise budgetary control in the manner intended by the
Framers. Presidents never even submitted a budget to Con-
gress during the first 100 years, despite their power to do
so.' 5 Congress asserted itself and sought decentralization of
executive budgetary affairs. Budgetmaking was an almost ex-
clusively legislative function."6
The executive branch was not totally shut out of the
spending decisionmaking process, however. The law estab-
lishing the Treasury Department required the Secretary of
the Treasury "to prepare and report estimates of the public
revenues,' and the public expenditures."" While there was
substantial interest in public finance during this period and
an appreciation of the need for balanced budgets, no formal
budgetmaking process existed. Because revenues from tariffs
and taxes during most of the nineteenth century covered all
Congressionally-mandated spending, 8 a formal budgetmak-
ing process was unnecessary.
In 1921 Congress passed the Budget and Accounting
Act,19 mandating the submission of an annual Presidential
budget and creating the Bureau of the Budget, which is now
the Office of Management and Budget. The landmark Em-
ployment Act of 194620 required the Federal government to
12. U.S. CONST. art.l, §8, cl. 1.
13. Id., ci. 2.
14. Id., cl. 1.
15. L. KIMMEL, FEDERAL BUDGET AND FISCAL POLICY, 1789-1958, at 3
(1959) (quoting A. BUCK, PUBLIC BUDGETING 17 (1929)).
16. Id.
17. Id.; Pub. L. No. 1-12, 1 Stat. 65 (codified as amended.in scat-
tered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
18. In the 112 peacetime years between 1791 and 1916, revenues
from customs exceeded internal revenues in all but 12. Of these years, only
three were prior to 1900: 1867, 1868, and 1894. Moreover, internal reve-
nue exceeded customs in only five of the fourteen years prior to 1900 clas-
sified as was periods: 1864, 1865, 1866, 1898, and 1899. L. KIMMEL, Supra
note 15, at 313 n. 3.
19. Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (repealed and replaced by various
sections of 31 .U.S.C.).
20. Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 15
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promote maximum employment,"1  production, 2 and
purchasing power,"3 and required the President to send Con-
gress an annual report on the economic outlook for the coun-
try, together with recommendations for measures to achieve
greater employment and economic growth. This act has been
reinforced and supplemented by the Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978,' known as the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act.
Congress took perhaps its most important step to limit
apparently growing Presidential authority over the
budgetmaking process by enacting the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974." This act created a
Congressional budget process. It was designed to allow the
legislative branch to review the budget as a whole, rather
than in piecemeal fashion. Prior to enactment of the Budget
Act, there was no single legislative vehicle for considering
overall budget spending levels and priorities. Instead, spend-
ing decisions were made through the 13 annual regular ap-
propriations bills,2" and the other bills that contained spend-
ing authority.2 7 The Budget Act allowed Congress to act on
annual budget resolutions that would set spending targets
and revenue requirements for the upcoming fiscal year and
which could limit spending in appropriations bills, since they
would have to conform with budget resolution guidelines. 8
Significantly, the budget resolution is a purely Congressional
process. Budget resolutions, unlike bills, are not submitted to
the President,29 and therefore cannot be vetoed.
If restraining the growth of federal spending and closing
federal deficits are the criteria for judging whether the
Budget Act is a success, the Act is a failure. Deficits are gen-
erally much larger than pre-1974, and the budgetary trend is
towards further deficit growth.
U.S.C. §1021-1024 (1982)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § § 632,
636; 12 U.S.C. § 225a; 15 U.S.C. § § 1021-1024, 3101-3152 (1982)).
25. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified at various sections of
1 U.S.C., 2 U.S.C.; repealed and replaced by various sections of 31 U.S.C.).
26. 1983 Weekly Report 2352.
27. Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 298.
29. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of 1 and 2
U.S.C.).
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Passage of the Budget Act was preceded by problems
with the appropriations process, which the Act was intended
to help cure. Instead, the breakdown of the appropriations
process has continued. Congress attempts to act on thirteen
regular appropriations bills each year.30 In the last ten years,
however, Congress has never completed action before the
start of the fiscal year. In fact, in a number of years, Congress
never completed action on all thirteen bills, passing instead a
"continuing resolution,"'" a mechanism to allow spending to
continue despite Congress' failure to act on the regular ap-
propriations bill. Even the continuing resolution has grown
beyond its original purpose of providing stopgap spending
authority. It is now often used as a method of combining two
or more appropriations bills into one giant legislative
monster.
Although the breakdown in the spending process has
caused renewed interest in the item veto, the idea itself is not
new. The item veto first appeared in the Confederate Consti-
tution. 2 While the Confederacy did not catch on, the item
veto did. Now 43 of the 50 states 3 have item veto provisions
in their constitutions, and none have ever acted to repeal
them. The item veto spread most rapidly in the period before
the turn of the century. Every state admitted to the Union
after the Civil War included the item veto as part of its con-
stitution. More recent state actions indicate continued sup-
port for the idea. For example, at its most recent state consti-
tutional convention in 1970, Illinois drafted a new
constitution 8' which contained authority for the Governor to
30. F. Riddick, Senate Procedure (1981).
31. See Calendars of the U.S. House of Representatives and History
of Legislation, Final Editions; 94th-98th Congresses.
32. "The President may veto any appropriation or appropriations
and approve any other appropriation or appropriations in the same bill."
C.S.A. PROV. CONST. art. 1, §5 (1861). "The President may approve any ap-
propriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill, desig-
nate the appropriations disapproved, and shall return a copy of such appro-
priations with his objections to the house in which the bill originated and
the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved
by the President," This item veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote
of the Congress C.S.A. CONsT. art. 1, § 7 (1861).
33. Ross and Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President, 12 Pres.
Stud. Q. 66 (1982).
34. "The Governor may reduce or veto any item of appropriation
in a bill presented to him. Portions of a bill not reduced as vetoed shall
become law. An item vetoed shall be returned to the house in which it
originated and may become law in the same manner as a vetoed bill. An
item reduced in amount shall be returned to the house in which it
19851
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veto or reduce individual items of appropriations.
While the widespread acceptance of the item veto in the
states indicates its merit at the state level, the idea has never
been considered seriously at the federal level. Over 140 item
veto proposals have been introduced in Congress since Con-
gressman Faulkner of West Virginia proposed the first one in
1876.35 At least seven different Presidents, including Grant,
Hayes, Arthur, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower,
and Reagan, have expressed their support for the item veto.
Most item veto proposals, however, were buried in the
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. A few were reported adversely. 6 Only once, on
April 21, 1884, was an item veto proposal ever reported fa-
vorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee,"' and that propo-
sal, was not acted on by the full Senate, however.
The House of Representatives indicated its support for
the item veto at least once in the last century. In 1883, the
House moved to suspend its rules and discharge its Judiciary
Committee from further consideration of an item veto pro-
posal. Although the vote was 101-for to 58-against, the mo-
tion failed because a two-thirds votes was needed."8 The
House Judiciary Committee has held hearings on item veto
proposals on three different occasions: September 9, 1913,39
February 2, 1938,"0 and May 27, 1957.41 The Senate Judici-
originated and may be restored to its original amount in the same manner
as a vetoed bill except that the required record vote shall be a majority of
the members elected to each house. If a reduced item is not so restored, it
shall become law in the reduced amount." ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9, cl. (d)
(1970).
35. Faulkner's proposal was restricted to the deletion of items from
appropriation bills. H.R. 46, 44th Cong., 1st sess., CONG. REC. 500 (1876).
Most of the other proposals also limited the exercise of the veto power to
appropriations bills without granting authority to reduce an item. Ross &
Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President? 12 Pirs. STUD. Q. 66 (1982).
36. Senator McMillan of Minnesota and Senator Morgan of Ala-
bama introduced S.R. 4 and 21 on March 21 and April 14, 1879, respec-
tively. These resolutions were adversely reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee on February 9, 1880. Consideration was later postponed indefi-
nitely. S.R. 4.21, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REc. 751 (1880).
37. S.J.R. 18, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REC. 3164 (1884).
38. H.R. 267, 47th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REc. 3611 (1883). This
resolution, introduced by Rep. Flower of New York, was the only one sub-
jected to a vote in either House.
39. Veto Power of President: Hearings on S.J.R. 36, H.J.R. 15 Before the
House Judiciary Comm., 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) This bill was not
reported.
40. Item Veto: Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. on H.J.R. 72,
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ary Committee has held only two hearings: May 13, 1954,42
and April 9, 1984."s
Lack of federal support for the item veto is not due to a
lack of effectiveness at the state level, however. While there
has been no comprehensive study done on the economic ef-
fects of the item veto in the states, there is a fair amount of
evidence indicating that the item veto will restrain spending.
For example, at the 1954 Senate hearing on the item veto,
Representative Bennett of Florida testified that twelve states
achieved substantial savings through use of the item veto."
Governor Adlai Stevenson also testified that "it has enabled
me to veto more appropriations, involving more money, than
any Governor in Illinois history."'45
More recently, Illinois Governor Thompson has been
able to cut about 3% off appropriations bills each year.48 As
Governor of California, President Reagan used the item veto
to reduce spending by an average of 2% per year. 47 In 1983,
Illinois saved $174.7 million using the item veto, and an addi-
tional $26 million using the reduction veto; 24 of the 58 state
departments and agencies had their budgets vetoed or cut.4 8
In the same year, California Governor Deukmejian line-item
vetoed $1.2 billion in spending. 9
196, 469, 470, 515, and 555, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
41. Item Veto: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary
Comm. on H.J.R. 47, 239, 245, 343 and H.R. 830, 7405, 7679, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957). Provides detailed history of item veto proposals prior to
1957.
42. Item Veto: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm.
on S.J.R. 30, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
43. Line-Item Veto: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.J.R. 26, 178 and S. 1921, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
44. Rep. Bennett reported on figures from his informal poll of gov-
ernors: S. Carolina, 40 vetoes, $958,261; Florida, "about a dozen", "sev-
eral million dollars"; N. Mexico, 4 vetoes, $364, 727; Texas, 2 of 3,
amount unknown; Louisiana, 4 $3,025,000; N. Dakota, S, $200.000, S. Da-
kota, 2, $50,000; Utah, 27, $4,157,803; Washington, 82, $11,863,486;
Colorado, 2, $75,866; Michigan, 1, $340,000; California, 10, $56,532,500.
Hearings, supra note 42, at 4. See generally, Hearings, supra note 41, at 78-92
(statement of Frank Prescott, Professor, Univ. of Chattanooga).
45. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on S.J. Res. 30, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1954).
46. Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, 343 HERITAGE FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER 8 (1984).
47. Id.
48. American Enterprise Inst.,Proposals for Line Item Veto Authority
(1983).
49. Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, supra note 46 at 8.
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The success of the item veto at the state level provides
some insight into what it could achieve at the federal level. It
has been calculated that if the item veto had been in place
and had saved just 1% per year of total Federal spending, the
cumulative savings over a twelve-year period from 1974
through 1985 would reduce the 1985 deficit by $105 billion,
over half the deficit now estimated for that year.50 Over the
same period, the same source calculates a reduction in the
1985 deficit of $49 billion, or about 25%, if savings of only
2% of total discretionary spending were achieved. 51
The Budget Committee of the House of Representa-
tives52 states that $503 billion of the estimated $928 billion
fiscal 1985 budget would be exempt from the line-item veto
as follows:
- net interest payments $127 Billion
- Social Security $187 Billion
- Medicare and Medicaid $ 92 Billion
- Other mandatory programs $ 97 Billion
Total amount exempt from item veto: $503 Billion
The Committee further states that the prime areas where the
item veto would apply are national defense 51 - $265 billion
- and nondefense discretionary spending5 - about $161
billion. It points out that much spending in fiscal 1985, how-
ever, is based on prior year budget authority and therefore is
also exempt from an item veto - $90 billion of defense and
$78 billion of discretionary - thus leaving only $257 billion
subject to the item veto. 5 The Budget Committee goes on to
exempt the rest of military spending from the item veto be-
cause President Reagan favors increases in that area. This
leaves only $83 billion subject to the item veto.5 It therefore
concludes that the item veto could not reduce deficits in the
short run because it could not reach the vast majority of fed-
eral expenditures. 57
50. Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, supra note 46, at 4.
51. Id.
52. HousE BUDGET COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SESs., THE LINE-ITEM
VETO: AN APPRAISAL 5 No. CP-4A (Comm. Print 1984).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Of course, the item veto has its dramatic effects over
time; it is not reasonable to judge a permanent constitutional
change on the basis of one year's figures. The item veto rep-
resents a long-term not a short-term solution to federal
budget problems. While a large part of the budget is uncon-
trollable if viewed in isolation, a much greater share of the
budget is subject to the veto when viewed over a longer time
period. 58
Further, while entitlements were about 45% of total fis-
cal 1984 spending, entitlement programs accounted for less
than 25% of the total deficit that year.5 This is because the
bulk of entitlements are subject to a type of "balanced
budget" requirement. Social Security and Medicare, for ex-
ample, are supported by dedicated taxes, and do not call on
general revenues. To a large extent, however, those parts of
the budget subject to the item veto are unsupported by suffi-
cient tax revenue, and therefore contribute more directly to
federal deficits.
One important reason for the item veto's success is its
effectiveness in reducing the use of legislative tactics that con-
tribute to excessive spending and waste. In a Wall Street
Journal article, Henry Hazlitt stated that "Congress has per-
fected the device of throwing in pork-barrel, log-rolling, and
other vote-buying appropriations with those that the Presi-
dent needs to carry on the government. In addition, Con-
gress has perfected the practice of passing its appropriations
bills at the very end of a session, so that if the President ve-
toed a typical omnibus spending bill in order to get rid of an
objectionable item, he would be left without any money at
all. So far as appropriations bills are concerned, Congress has
usurped total power. The presidential veto has been reduced
to a nullity. ' 6 0
Others have made the same point. By trading support
for one another's projects and proposals, Congressmen can
pass legislation containing excessive and wasteful spending.6 '
Carried to an extreme, pork-barrelling and logrolling can
lead to an absurd situation: the more broadly a bill is sup-
ported, the more excessive and wasteful it may be. 2
58. Palffy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, supra note 46, at 4.
59. BUDGET 1985, supra note 1.
60. Hazlitt, Line-Item Leash on Runaway Spending, Wall St. J., Sept. 9,
1983, at 32, col. 4, 5.
61. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 75.
62. Id.
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Further, the trading is not always related to public works
projects, or other brick and mortar legislation. Congress has
grown expert at assembling huge omnibus bills. If the Presi-
dent vetoes such bills, vital government programs and activi-
ties may come to a halt. 3 For instance, the Wall Street Jour-
nal pointed to final Congressional action on a "mind-
boggling" $91 billion appropriations bill and commented
that "surely, the item veto is a more prudent way to deal with
sums of this size."
64
The effects of Congressional tactics on the President's
current veto power may be summarized as follows:
Despite constitutional provisions implying that the Presi-
dent shall be free to give effect to his independent judge-
ment upon the merits of each bill which comes before him
for approval, the President, in fact, has little or no choice.
Appropriations bills almost invariably are composed of
items necessary for public welfare as well as items not neces-
sarily in the national interest. The President may "choose"
to accept the bill in its entirety thus approving the undesir-
able and unnecessary items and the wasteful expenditure of
funds, and assenting to any attached legislative "riders" or
he may reject the bill in its entirety, thus risking delay if not
discontinuance of necessary functions and work on needed
projects. When appropriations bills are rushed through
Congress in the closing days and perhaps hours of the legis-
lative session, as is often the case, the President has, for all
practical purposes, no choice at all. Yet it is under the stress
of these conditions that some of the most objectionable fea-
tures can be and are attached to appropriations bills."a
Presidential use of the veto in the post-World War II era
seems to support the conclusion that the veto power has been
eroded in the budget area. The eight American Presidents
since Franklin D. Roosevelt (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan) have vetoed a to-
tal of 645 bills.66 Excluding pocket vetoes, these Presidents
vetoed 384 bills.6 7 Only 39, or about 1%, were successfully
63. Id. at 69.
64. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1983, at 32, col.1
65. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 69.
66. Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1976, compiled by Senate Library,
Sept., 1978; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1977-1983; Congressional
Research Service issue brief, Vetoes: President Reagan.
67. Id.
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overridden by Congress.68 If appropriation bills are singled
out, however, a much different picture emerges. First, these
Presidents vetoed very few appropriations bills.69 Truman,
who vetoed 180 bills, vetoed only one appropriations bill."0
Reagan has vetoed only three.7 1 These figures indicate that
either Presidents were satisfied with the spending levels in
the bill or that there were factors preventing them from us-
ing the veto as extensively in the budget area as they did in
other areas.
Second, when these Presidents did veto an appropria-
tions bill, the veto was much more likely to be overridden.
While only 1% of all regular vetoes were overridden by the
necessary two-thirds vote in both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate, 35% of the vetoes of appropriations bills
were overridden.7 2 An appropriations veto was therefore
much less likely to be sustained than a regular veto, perhaps
further deterring a President from exercising it in the former
case.
The item veto, because it forces Congress to consider
each project on its own merit, and because it exposes logroll-
ing and pork-barrelling to the light of day, will return to the
President the veto power he possessed before these legislative
tactics became so prevalent. The nature of the federal gov-
ernment has changed; Congress must respond to that change.
Given the present scope and nature of the federal govern-
ment and the ongoing fiscal crisis facing the United States,
Congress cannot continue logrolling and pork-barrelling.
When the U.S. Constitution was written, the states were
the dominant political institutions. The principal federal role,
measured by manpower (including defense), was running the
nation's mails.7 3 Until 1940, federal expenditures were
smaller than combined state and local expenditures.7 4 By
1983, federal expenditures were almost twice the combined
state and local spending. 75 This is more than just a change in
numbers. It represents a dramatic shift in the nature and role
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Presidential Vetoes 1789-1976, supra note 66.
71. Congressional Research Service issue brief, Vetoes: President
Reagan, No. IB811y4.
72. Presidential Vetoes, supra note 66.
73. Historical Statistics of the United States, Bureau of Census, Sep-
tember, 1978.
74. Economic Report of the President, February, 1984, Table B-75.
75. Id.
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of the federal government. Individual state spending deci-
sions do not have a significant impact on the overall perform-
ance of the U.S. economy. On the other hand, federal budget
expenditures frequently influence the economy. The Employ-
ment Act of 1946 7 and the later Humphrey-Hawkins Act"
provide official recognition of what became apparent during
the Roosevelt "New Deal".
As government has grown, Congress has eroded the abil-
ity of the President to participate in shaping and controlling
that growth. Congress sent as many or more appropriations
bills to the President in the 1840's as it sends him now. The
Presidential veto has become a blunt weapon, less and less
capable of being used to control federal spending. "Congres-
sional practices . . . have tended to negate the system of
checks and balances which is a basic principle of our system
of government. ' 78 Congress has eroded Presidential disciplin-
ing of spending decisions without implementing any workable
substitute. Nonetheless, many members of Congress have
strong reservations regarding the item veto. The testimony
of Senator Hatfield, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, at this year's hearing on the item veto, provides
an excellent summary of what is probably the principal con-
cern. Senator Hatfield stated that the item veto would "make
a substantial shift in the balance of powers between the Exec-
utive and Legislative branches of government."79 He further
stated that:
the President can and does effectively use his veto power to
enforce his aggregate budgetary plan on Congressional
spending bills. The item veto, however, will empower the
President to go beyond simple control on overall spending,
and allow him to virtually dictate spending priorities over
individual programs and activities. With this power the
President can frustrate a decision of the Congress on any
individual program, be it for political or ideological reasons
- or simply because of personal bias.8"
76. Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § § 1021-1024 (1982)).
77. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 632,
636; 12 U.S.C. § 225a; 15 U.S.C. § 1021-1024, 3101-3152 (1982)).
78. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 77.
79. Line Item Veto: Hearings on S.J.R. 26, 178 and S.1921 Before the
Subcomm. on The Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.26 (1984) (statement of Sen-
ator Hatfield, Chairman, Senate Appropriation Comm.).
80. Id.
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The concern is fundamental. Senator Hatfield and many
others in Congress view the item veto as a new grant of
power to the President at the expense of Congress. Many in
Congress believe the legislative branch has already ceded too
much authority over the budget to the executive. 1 If correct,
this is a damning indictment of the item veto. Separation of
powers and maintenance of a balance of powers is at the
heart of the American system of government. Opponents of
the item veto are really arguing that the President is intrud-
ing into the legislative arena, where he has no right to be. A
look at the constitutional history of the President's existing
veto power demonstrates that the argument may not be as
strong as it first appears.
Considering America's history, it is remarkable that the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 included any kind of veto
power for the President. Before the American Revolution,
legislative acts of the colonies or states-to-be were subject to
two vetoes. Both the Governor of the colony and the King of
England could veto bills, and both vetoes were absolute-not
subject to an override by the legislature." The colonies natu-
rally resented and opposed this type of veto. In fact, the first
two grievances set forth in the Declaration of Independence
stated that "He [George III] has refused his assent to laws
... . He has forbidden his Governors to pass laws .... "83
During and immediately after the American Revolution,
therefore, there was a strong disposition against any veto
power for governors or any national executive. During this
time period, no state except Massachusetts gave its governor
any kind of veto.84 Some states dispensed with governors alto-
gether, using a commission instead.8 5 At the national level,
under the Articles of Confederation there was not even an
executive commission, except the "Committee of States"86
which managed governmental activities when Congress was
not in session. "[I]n fact, the Articles went to the other ex-
treme and granted to five states, and in some cases to a single
state, the authority that was so feared in the executive: for
the assent of nine of the thirteen states was required to all
important acts, and unanimous assent was required to amend-
81. H. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET 16 (1984).
82. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 67.
83. The Declaration of Independence para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
84. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 67.
85. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER (1890).
86. The Articles of Confederation art. IX (U.S. 1777).
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ments to the articles." 8 By 1787, however, the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution recognized the inadequacies of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. They decided that a national execu-
tive was needed. 88
The scope of the presidential veto power which the Con-
stitution provided has been a matter of some dispute. There
is general agreement that the veto can be used to protect the
executive branch from legislative encroachment, 9 and that
the President can veto bills he believes are unconstitutional."
On the other hand, vetoes for policy purposes - bills vetoed
because the President thinks they are unwise - have gener-
ated periodic objections from members of Congress and
scholars. 1 One commentator called the current broad use of
the veto power an illustration of "the power of text over ex-
pectation," indicating his belief that the Framers did not in-
tend the veto power to be used for policy purposes. 2
Today, however, Presidents use the veto to disapprove
bills because they are unwise, too costly, low-priority, or for
numerous other policy reasons. There is nothing in the text
of the Constitution to prevent such a use of the veto power.
In fact, there is evidence that some of the most prominent
framers of the Constitution anticipated and approved of such
a use.9" For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the
veto power:
not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes
an additional security against the enaction of improper
laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative
body calculated to guard the community against the effects
of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good which may happen to influence a majority of
that body.""
Likewise, during the Constitutional Convention, James
87. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER (1890).
88. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 67.
89. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87,
89 (1976). J4
90. L. Fisher, Presidental Powers (Congressional Research Service
report).
91. Id.
92. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, supra note 89.
93. See, The Federalist No. 23, and L. Fisher, Presidential Powers,
supra note 90.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 443 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
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Madison stated that the veto is available "to restrain the Leg-
islature from encroaching . . . on the rights of the people at
large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incor-
rect in their form. ' 95
Woodrow Wilson also recognized the importance of the
legislative role of the President. Before he became President,
he wrote: "For in the exercise of his power of veto, which is
of course, beyond all comparison, his most formidable pre-
rogative, the President acts not as the executive but as a third
branch of the legislature" And again: "The President is no
greater than his prerogative of the veto makes him; he is, in
other words, powerful as a branch of the legislature rather
than as the titular head of the Executive." '96
The text of the Constitution provides a further indica-
tion that the President was intended to play a legislative role:
the veto power is contained in Article I, the legislative article,
rather than in article II, the executive article."" The Consti-
tution gives the President additional powers of a legislative
character. It allows the President to order Congress to con-
vene. 98 It also requires the President to "give the Congress
information on the state of the union, and recommend for
their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient." 99
Even if the Constitution envisions a strong role for the
President in the legislative process, the balance of power
questions remains unanswered. Whether the item veto
changes the balance of power in favor of the President de-
pends on whether the item veto expands his veto power.
As discussed earlier, some commentators argue that the
item-veto is a restoration of rather than an increase in the
veto power the Constitution intended the President to
have."'0 The legislative tactics that have eroded the Presi-
dent's veto power were uncommon when the Constitution
was written. These tactics did not become prevalent until
about the time of the Civil War,01 and their increased usage
during that period is what caused the Confederacy to include
an item veto in its constitution.0 2 The item veto is thus a
95. Fisher, supra note 90, at .
96. Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, supra note 92, at 88.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
100. Ross & Schwengel, supra note 35, at 77 (1982).
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id.
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reaction to legislative tactics that have tended to undermine
the President's veto; it therefore restores the status quo.
S.J. Res. 26 does not fully depend on this argument,
however, because it permits an item veto to be overridden by
a majority of Congress."'3 It requires a President to choose:
either veto an entire bill, forcing Congress to attempt to
override by a two-thirds vote, or use the item veto, recogniz-
ing that it would be easier for Congress to override. S.J. Res.
26 allows the President to put the Congress on record to see
whether there is in fact majority support for certain individ-
ual items of spending in an omnibus bill.
The 97th Congress approved 473 public laws. An addi-
tional 215 public laws were approved in 1983. Even the rela-
tively few appropriation bills within that total entail hundreds
of pages. No single Congressman or Senator reads every line
of every bill. Instead, Congress relies on the judgments of a
few of its members on any given issue, and, like the Presi-
dent, on the judgment of its staff.
Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida, arguing against the
item veto, stated that:
the President doesn't sit down and read this budget line-by-
line . . . . It's not even the Director of OMB, Mr. Stock-
man. It is some guy with a little green shade that sits in the
bowels of OMB, who's never liked a project, who's always
been against it, and he says here's my chance, he puts it on
the list for the line-item veto ....
Now that little fellow that sits in OMB, no one elects
him, no one can write a letter to him, he doesn't change
whether the Republicans are in office or the Democrats are
in office, he listens to no hearings. Now the Congress sets
up and holds all of the hearings on the budget. We are the
ones that the people think are responsible because the Con-
stitution says we tax and spend the money. . . (but) that lit-
tle fellow down in the bowels of OMB is making that deci-
sion .... 104
Senator Chiles may be eloquent but not completely accurate,
for with majority override, the item veto would require Con-
gress to demonstrate that there is in fact the majority support
103. S.J. Res. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 5836-38
(1983).
104. Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, "The American
Debate," Resolved: That the President Should Have Line-Item Veto
Power, Program No. 46.
[Vol. I
THE CASE FOR
for an item that legislative theory says exists. It would require
Congress to go on record in situations where Congressional
staff and experts are not able to reach agreement with Presi-
dential staff and experts.
After all, the fact that a bill passes Congress is supposed
to mean that there is majority support for that bill, including
every item in it. If an item were not supported by a majority,
there are numerous opportunities to offer an amendment to
remove such an item. S.J. Res. 26 would reveal the numerous
pork-barrelling and logrolling deals. If Senators and Repre-
sentatives cannot afford to go on record on those deals, then
perhaps they should not have been made in the first place.
Majority override would prevent a President from over-
turning strong Congressional support for a single item
through use of the item veto and the support of "one-third
plus one" in either the House or the Senate. An item veto
would be sustained only if the President could command ma-
jority support in at least one House; it would be overturned if
Congress could demonstrate majority support.
An item veto with majority override thus works to en-
sure that the balance of powers is not upset. It would make
the President's veto power more effective by exposing log-
rolling, pork-barrelling and other legislative tactics that con-
tribute to excessive spending and waste. The item veto does
not require a two-thirds vote to be effective. By requiring
Congress to vote on individual items the item veto will de-
crease the likelihood that the presence of inappropriate items
will endanger items for which there is actually majority
support.
Of course, a constitutional amendment providing an item
veto is not the only way to bring additional discipline to the
budgetmaking process. Some suggest that use of the im-
poundment power would be an adequate .remedy. However,
unrestricted Presidential impoundments undermines the leg-
islative process and the rule of law. Unrestricted impound-
ment authority would permit a President to sign an appropri-
ations bill, but then not spend the money it contained. Even a
two-thirds majority in Congress would be left with no way to
overturn that Presidential decision short of passing another
law.
It does not make Constitutional sense, however, to force
Congress to pass a second law in order to say in effect that
"we really mean it; spend the funds." Enactment of the first
law must result in release of the money as called for in the
statute if the lawmaking function is to have any meaning at
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all. President Nixon discovered that fact when he attempted
to make overly broad use of impoundment authority. The re-
sult was enactment of the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act.105
Whether the Budget Act restricted Presidential im-
poundment authority is open to debate. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the Act resulted in an explicit outline of the
range of authority available to the President. To oversim-
plify, Congress stated that a President could use two mecha-
nisms, recissions and deferrals, to impound funds appropri-
ated by law and it placed strong controls over each. A
President was never permitted to rescind funds unilaterally.
He could propose a rescission, but unless Congress enacted
legislation rescinding that appropriation within 45 days, the
funds had to be released. A President could defer spending
temporarily, unless either the House or the Senate passed a
resolution not subject to presidential veto directing that the
money be spent.'"
Others have suggested that it would be much simpler
and quicker to pass a statute than to amend the Constitution,
which requires approval by both Houses of Congress and rat-
ification of of three-fourths of the states. Because of its dissat-
isfaction with its ability to deal with the deficit problem, last
year the Senate came close to greatly expanding the Presi-
dent's rescission authority by giving him a type of statutory
item veto. The amendment, sponsored by Senators Arm-
strong and Long, established quarterly targets for growth in
the ceiling on the amount of outstanding federal debt.1"' If
targets would otherwise be exceeded, the President could
then reduce spending for already appropriated items by up to
20%.108 This provision made it a somewhat limited statutory
item veto, or, more accurately, a form of reduction veto. It
would have permitted a President to reduce individual items
of spending.10 9 The amendment had strong support in the
105. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
2 U.S.C. § 681 (1982).
106. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 §
684, 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1982). The Supreme Court's decision in Immigration
and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 U.S. 2764, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983),
has cast some doubt as to the validity of this provision.
107. Proposed amendment no. 2625 to 5.2062, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. S16318 (1983).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Senate, but was defeated by a vote of 49 to 46.110
An even more far-reaching amendment... was proposed
by Senator Mattingly of Georgia. It would have directed the
Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House to split
appropriations bills into parts and to send each part to the
President as if it were an individual bill subject to veto." 2 Be-
cause there have been no court decisions related to either of
these two amendments or with respect to any other statutory
item veto proposal, conclusions as to their constitutionality
are tentative.
The Congressional Research Service has suggested two
reasons why a statutory item veto may not be constitutional.
First, the Constitution sets out a very detailed description of
the legislative process and provides a limited legislative role
for the President, a role that cannot be enlarged without vio-
lating the Constitution. Second, to "so enlarge the legislative
role of the President in the process of enacting legislation is
to create a 'potential for disruption' of the legislative
process."" 3
Regardless of its constitutionality, a statutory item veto
would also be poor policy because it would give the Presi-
dent, in effect, two bites at the same apple and therefore
would upset the balance of powers. A President now has the
constitutional right to either veto a bill or sign it." 4 If he
signs it the spending becomes law. If the President could also
unilaterally rescind or otherwise negate that spending, he
would essentially have the right to make law on his own. Ad-
ditionally, if the President were permitted to rescind even if a
bill was passed over his veto, the balance of powers would be
further disrupted.
A constitutional amendment authorizing an item veto,
on the other hand, builds on the role already assigned the
President under the Constitution. It gives the President the
right to assent or veto items of spending before they become
law. It does not give the President two shots at the same tar-
get. Instead, it puts him in the position he would be in if an
110. 129 CONG. REC S16334 (Daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983) (vote on Sen.
Armstrong's proposed amendment). see supra note 110 and accompanying
text).
111. Proposed amendment no. 7056 to S.2565, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
130 CONG. REC. S.13435 (1984).
112. S.J. Res. 178, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 13,591-92
(1983).
113. Id.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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item came before him as an individual measure, rather than
as part of an omnibus bill.
The line-item veto is a proven and effective mechanism
for providing needed fiscal discipline in the budget area.
Forty-three of the fifty states have item veto provisions in
their constitutions. The states gave their governors this au-
thority because it was needed, because it works, and because
it strengthens their budget processes.
The United States should take advantage of this wealth
of experience at the state level and act to make the item veto
part of the Constitution. If the item veto was in place and
could be used as effectively as it was in Illinois last year, 115 the
current federal deficit could be reduced by $27 billion " 6 this
year alone.
The item veto builds on the President's current veto
power. It will make his legislative role more effective, and
help eliminate the use of legislative tactics that contribute to
excessive spending and waste. With majority override, the
item veto ensures that fiscal discipline is not achieved by radi-
cally upsetting the balance of powers which lies at the heart
of the American system of government.
While the item veto can be an effective means to help
reduce federal deficits, it is no panacea. The item veto alone
will not eliminate federal deficits that exceeded $175 billion
in fiscal 1984. Further, it is only a tool. As a tool, its effective-
ness depends on the effectiveness of the President using it. It
will not make a weak President strong, but it will help a
strong President check federal spending. Because it is pro-
posed as an amendment to the Constitution, it must be
viewed in an institutional context. The item veto should not
be supported or opposed because of the manner in which a
particular President would use it. Rather, debate should focus
on the long-term impact on the relationship between the
President and Congress. Viewed in this light, an item veto
with majority override is a positive, useful, and important ad-
dition to the Constitution.
115. Information provided by Gov. Thompson and the Bureau of the
Budget of the State of Illinois.
116. Assuming that federal spending would be reduced by the same
proportion that spending was reduced in Illinois.
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